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Abstract
This paper explores the possibilities and limitations of error correction by the structural
simplicity of error mechanisms. Specifically, we consider channel models, called samplable ad-
ditive channels, in which (a) errors are efficiently sampled without the knowledge of the coding
scheme or the transmitted codeword; (b) the entropy of the error distribution is bounded; and
(c) the number of errors introduced by the channel is unbounded. For the channels, several
negative and positive results are provided. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there
are samplable additive errors of entropy nǫ for ǫ ∈ (0, 1) that are pseudorandom, and thus not
correctable by efficient coding schemes. It is shown that there is an oracle algorithm that induces
a samplable distribution over {0, 1}n of entropy m = ω(logn) that is not pseudorandom, but is
uncorrectable by efficient schemes of rate less than 1 −m/n − o(1). The results indicate that
restricting error mechanisms to be efficiently samplable and not pseudorandom is insufficient for
error correction. As positive results, some conditions are provided under which efficient error
correction is possible.
1 Introduction
In the theory of error-correcting codes, two of the most-studied channel models are probabilistic
channels and worst-case channels. In probabilistic channels, errors are introduced through stochas-
tic processes, and the most well-known one is the binary symmetric channel (BSC). In worst-case
(or adversarial) channels, errors are introduced adversarially by considering the choice of coding
schemes and transmitted strings, called codewords, under the restriction of the error rate, which is
the ratio of the number of errors to the length of the codeword. In his seminal work [28], Shannon
showed that reliable communication can be achieved over BSC if the coding rate, which represents
the efficiency of transmission, is less than 1−h2(p), where h2(·) is the binary entropy function, and
p is the crossover probability of BSC. In contrast, it is known that reliable communication cannot
be achieved over worst-case channels when the error rate is at least 1/4 unless the coding rate tends
to zero [25].
If we view the introduction of errors as computation of the channel, probabilistic channels
perform low-cost computation with little knowledge about the coding scheme and the transmitted
codeword, while worst-case channels perform high-cost computation with the full-knowledge. As in-
termediate channels between probabilistic channels and worst-case channels, Lipton [21] introduced
computationally-bounded channels, where errors are introduced by polynomial-time computation. It
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has been demonstrated that reliable communication for these intermediate channels can be achieved
by more efficient schemes than those for worst-case ones [21, 24, 15].
Although there have been many studies on error correction in various channel models, the
most basic principle for error correction has been the same: the number of errors occurred in
communications is restricted. Namely, an upper bound on the error rate is a priori provided, and
coding schemes are designed with the knowledge of the bound. However, since qualitatively better
error correction is possible for computationally-bounded channels, it may be possible to correct
errors without resorting to the bound on the error rate. Thus, we ask the following question:
Is it possible to correct errors based on the structural simplicity of error mechanisms?
In this work, we partially answer the above question. Specifically, we introduce a novel channel
model, called samplable additive channel, and investigate the error-correction capabilities for the
channel. In samplable additive channels, (a) errors are efficiently sampled without the knowledge
of the coding scheme or the transmitted codeword; (b) the entropy of the error distribution is
bounded; and (c) the error rate is unbounded. Condition (a) means that there is a polynomial-
time algorithm that generates samples according to the error distribution, where the algorithm is
designed without the knowledge of the coding scheme, and does not receive the transmitted code-
word as input. The restriction of efficient samplability is also employed in the previous studies
of computationally-bounded channels. For a structural simplicity, condition (b) is necessary since
high-entropy distributions can generate unpredictable and complex errors. Condition (c) is em-
ployed for removing the effect of bounding the error rate for error correction. In addition, for the
ease of analysis, we mainly consider flat distributions, which are the uniform distributions over the
supports.
Samplable additive channels are relatively simple channel models since the error distributions
are identical for every coding scheme and transmitted codeword. The binary symmetric chan-
nel is an example. The setting is incomparable to previous notions of error correction against
computationally-bounded channels. Our model is stronger because we do not restrict the error
rate, but is weaker because the channel cannot see the code or the transmitted codeword.
1.1 The Setting
Before presenting our results, we briefly describe our problem setting.
The coding scheme, also referred to as code, consists of two functions Enc : {0, 1}Rn → {0, 1}n
and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}Rn, where R ∈ [0, 1] is called coding rate, or simply rate. A message
x ∈ {0, 1}Rn is encoded to Enc(x), and transmitted to the channel. The channel introduces an
error z ∈ {0, 1}n, and the decoder receives the string Enc(x) + z, where + is the bit-wise addition
modulo 2, and outputs x˜ = Dec(Enc(x) + z). Decoding is done successfully if x˜ = x. It is desirable
to construct a high-rate code that can successfully correct errors. The error rate is wz/n ∈ [0, 1],
where wz is the number of non-zero elements in z.
For every samplable additive channel, an error distribution Z over {0, 1}n is associated. If Z
is flat, each element in the support of Z is sampled with probability 1/|Z|, and thus the entropy
of Z is log |Z|, which takes values in [0, n]. In our setting, we assume that sampling from Z can
be simulated by a polynomial-time algorithm, the entropy of Z is bounded, and the error rate is
not bounded. In addition, the coding scheme can be chosen based on the knowledge of Z, and
an error vector z is sampled from Z without knowing Enc(x). We would like to know which Z is
(un)correctable, especially by efficient coding schemes.
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1.2 Main Results
We investigate the error correction capabilities of samplable additive errors.
Errors from flat distributions. By simple combinatorial arguments, it can be shown that any
flat Z can be corrected by a code of rate R ≤ 1−m/n−o(1), but cannot for rate R > 1−m/n−o(1),
where m is the entropy of Z. Thus, the rate 1 − m/n is essentially optimal. In addition, if
m = O(log n) and R ≤ 1 − m/n − o(1), both the encoding and the decoding can be done in
polynomial time.
Pseudorandom errors. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists pseudoran-
dom generators [17], which generate distributions that look random to every efficient algorithm.
Hence, no efficient scheme can correct errors from such distributions. It follows from this fact that,
assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists an error distribution Z with entropy nǫ
for any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1) that are not efficiently correctable.
Errors with membership test. To avoid the impossibility of correcting pseudorandom errors,
we consider samplable distributions for which membership test can be done efficiently. Such dis-
tributions are not pseudorandom since the membership test can be used to distinguish them from
the uniform distribution.
We show the existence of an uncorrectable distribution with membership test for low-rate codes.
As sampling algorithms, we employ oracle algorithms [2], which can make a black-box use of an
external entity called oracle. We present an oracle algorithm that induces a samplable distribution Z
of entropym = ω(log n) that is not correctable by efficient coding schemes of rateR < 1−m/n−o(1).
The result complements the impossibility of correcting flat distributions for rate R > 1−m/n−o(1).
Also, the entropy of ω(log n) is optimal since any flat Z with entropy O(log n) can be corrected by
a polynomial-time coding scheme.
Positive results. As a positive result, we show that if the set of error vectors forms a linear
subspace, then every error in the set can be corrected by an efficient coding scheme with optimal
rate.
Also, we derive a computational condition under which samplable additive errors can be cor-
rected. Intuitively, the condition is that a variant of the sampling algorithm of Z is efficiently
“invertible”. See Section 6.2 for the details. The result implies that the existence of one-way
functions is necessary for proving the impossibility results for correcting samplable errors.
We summarize our main results in Table 1, where R denotes the rate of coding schemes, and m
the entropy of Z.
1.3 Related Work
The notion of computationally-bounded channel was introduced by Lipton [21]. He showed that
if the sender and the receiver can share secret randomness, then the Shannon capacity can be
achieved for this channel. Micali et al. [24] considered a similar channel model in a public-key
setting, and gave a coding scheme based on list-decodable codes and digital signature. Gu-
ruswami and Smith [15] gave constructions of capacity achieving codes for worst-case additive-
error channel and time/space-bounded channels. They also gave an impossibility result for bit-
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Table 1: Correctability of Samplable Additive Error Z
Entropy m Correctabilities Assumptions References
∀ flat Z,
— (1) ∃ code correcting Z for None Proposition 3
R ≤ 1−m/n− o(1) in time O(n22m)
(2) not correctable for R > 1−m/n−o(1) None Proposition 4
nǫ
(0 < ǫ < 1) ∃Z not efficiently correctable for any R OWF Proposition 6
∃ Z with membership test, not efficiently
ω(log n)
correctable for R < 1−m/n− o(1) Oracle access Corollary 1
∀ flat Z over a linear subspace of dim. m,
— ∃ code correcting Z for R ≤ 1−m/n None Proposition 7
— ∀ flat Z = f(Ur) is efficiently correctable for g is not
R ≤ 1−m/n− o(1) distOWF Theorem 2
fixing channels, but their result can be applied to channels that use the information on the code
and the transmitted codeword. Shaltiel and Silbak [27] gave explicit list-decodable codes for
computationally-bounded channels based on complexity assumptions. Cryptographic treatment
of codes against computationally-bounded channels was studied in [35]. Note that all the previous
work of computationally-bounded channels assumes that the error rate is bounded above by some
constant p ∈ [0, 1], and codes can be constructed based on the knowledge of p.
Additive-error channels have been studied in the literature [7, 8, 20, 15]. In the previous studies,
the error rate is bounded, and the channel cannot see the transmitted codeword, but can depend on
the coding scheme. In the present study, stronger obliviousness is considered, in which the channel
cannot depend on the code.
Samplable distributions were also studied in the context of data compression [14, 30, 34], ran-
domness extractor [29, 33, 9], and randomness condenser [10]. Samplable distributions with mem-
bership test appeared in the study of efficient compressibility of samplable sources [14, 30, 34].
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we give the formal model of the problem, and introduce several notions of error-
correcting codes. Several results on the correctabilities of flat distributions are presented in Sec-
tion 3. The negative result of correcting pseudorandom errors appears in Section 4. In Section 5, we
show the existence of an error distribution with membership test that is not efficiently correctable.
The positive results are provided in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, we write [n] as the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a distribution X, we write x ∼ X to indicate
that x is chosen according to X. We may use X also as a random variable distributed according
to X. The support of X is Supp(X) = {x : PrX(x) 6= 0}, where PrX(x) is the probability
that X assigns to x. The Shannon entropy of X is given by −∑x∈Supp(X) PrX(x) log PrX(x).
For flat distributions, the Shannon entropy is equal to the min-entropy, which is defined to be
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minx∈Supp(X){− log PrX(x)}. Thus, we simply say that a flat distribution Z has entropy m if its
Shannon entropy is m. For n ∈ N, we write Un as the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n.
We define the notion of additive-error correcting codes.
Definition 1 (Additive-error correcting codes). For two functions Enc : Fk → Fn and Dec : Fn →
F
k, and a distribution Z over Fn, where k ≤ n and F is a finite field, we say (Enc,Dec) corrects
(additive error) Z with error probability ǫ if for any x ∈ Fk, we have that
Pr
z∼Z
[Dec(Enc(x) + z) 6= x] ≤ ǫ.
When ǫ = 0, we simply say (Enc,Dec) corrects Z. The rate of (Enc,Dec) is k/n.
Definition 2. A distribution Z is said to be correctable with rate R and error probability ǫ if there
is a pair of functions (Enc,Dec) of rate R that corrects Z with error probability ǫ.
We call a pair (Enc,Dec) a coding scheme or simply code. The coding scheme is called efficient
if Enc and Dec can be computed in polynomial-time in n. The code is called linear if Enc is a linear
mapping, that is, for any x, y ∈ Fn and a, b ∈ F, Enc(ax + by) = aEnc(x) + bEnc(y). If |F| = 2,
we may use {0, 1} instead of F. For any linear code (Enc,Dec), there is a matrix G ∈ Fk×n, called
a generator matrix, such that Enc(x) = x · G for all x ∈ Fk. We usually assume that G has full
rank, namely, the rank of G is k. A matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×n is called a parity-check matrix if for any
c ∈ Fn, c = Enc(x) for some x ∈ Fk if and only if HcT = 0. Then, it holds that GHT = 0. It is
well-known that given a parity-check matrix H ∈ F(n−k)×n of a code, one can compute a generator
matrix G of the code by finding a basis of the kernel of H. See [23, 26] for the basic properties of
linear codes.
Next, we define syndrome decoding for linear codes. Suppose v = Enc(x) + z ∈ Fn is received,
where Enc(x) is the transmitted codeword and z is the error vector. Syndrome decoder associates
e with v · HT , called the syndrome of v, because it holds that v · HT = (Enc(x) + z) · HT =
x ·G ·HT + z ·HT = z ·HT . If there is a way for recovering z from z ·HT , we can recover x from
v.
Definition 3. For a linear code (Enc,Dec), Dec is said to be a syndrome decoder if there is a
function Rec : Fn−k → Fn such that Dec(v) = (v − Rec(v · HT )) · G−1, where G and H are a
generator matrix and a parity-check matrix of the code, respectively, and G−1 ∈ Fn×k is a right
inverse matrix of G (i.e., GG−1 = I).
Note that for any full-rank matrix G, there always exist a right inverse matrix of G. In the
above definition, Rec recovers the error vector e from the syndrome v ·HT . Since v − e = Enc(x),
x is obtained by multiplying G−1 by Enc(x) = x ·G.
We consider a computationally-bounded analogue of additive-error channels. We introduce the
notion of samplable distributions.
Definition 4. A distribution family Z = {Zn}n∈N is said to be samplable if there is a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm S such that S(1n) is distributed according to Zn for every n ∈ N, where
1n is the string consisting of n ones.
We consider the setting in which coding schemes can depend on the sampling algorithm of
Z, but not on its random coins, and Z does not use any information on the coding scheme or
transmitted codewords. In this setting, the randomization of coding schemes does not help much.
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Proposition 1. Let (Enc,Dec) be a randomized coding scheme that corrects a distribution Z with
error probability ǫ. Then, there is a deterministic coding scheme that corrects Z with error proba-
bility ǫ.
Proof. Assume that Enc uses at most ℓ-bit randomness. Since (Enc,Dec) corrects Z with error
probability ǫ, we have that for every x ∈ Fk, Prz∼Z,r∼Uℓ[Dec(Enc(x; r) + z) 6= x] ≤ ǫ. By the
averaging argument, for every x ∈ Fk, there exists rx ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that Prz∼Z [Dec(Enc(x; rx)+z) 6=
x] ≤ ǫ. Thus, by defining Enc′(x) = Enc(x; rx), the deterministic coding scheme (Enc′,Dec) corrects
Z with error probability ǫ.
The above result reveals the crucial difference between our setting and that of Guruswami and
Smith [15], where the channels can use the information on the coding scheme, but not transmitted
codewords. They present a randomized coding scheme with optimal rate 1 − h2(p) for worst-case
additive-error channels, for which deterministic coding schemes are only known to achieve rate
1− h2(2p) for p < 1/2, where p is the error rate of the channels.
3 Errors from Flat Distributions
We investigate the correctability of general flat distributions over {0, 1}n.
First, we show that, for any flat distribution Z of entropy m, a random linear code of length
n and rate R can correct Z with error probability 1− 2−Ω(n) for R < 1−m/n− o(1). Consider a
random linear code of length n and rate R such that the parity check matrix H is chosen uniformly
at random from Hn,R = {0, 1}(n−Rn)×n , and a generator matrix G ∈ {0, 1}Rn×n is obtained by
finding a basis of the kernel of H. We use the syndrome decoding. Specifically, for a received word
v, the function Rec of the decoder is defined such that it maps v · HT to unique z ∈ Supp(Z)
satisfying v ·HT = z ·HT by searching for all possible z. If there are multiple candidates for z, it
outputs the decoding failure. Let Cn,R be the set of codes in which each code is defined by using
each element in HR,n as a parity-check matrix.
Proposition 2. For any flat distribution Z over {0, 1}n of entropy m, a (1−√ǫ)-fraction of codes
in Cn,R corrects Z with error probability
√
ǫ for R < 1−m/n, where ǫ = 2−n(1−R−m/n).
Proof. The probability that a random code from Cn,R fails the decoding is
Pr
H∈Hn,R,z∼Z
[∃z′ ∈ Supp(Z) \ {z} : z ·HT = z′ ·HT ]
= Pr
H,z
[∃z′∈ Supp(Z) \ {z} : ∀i ∈ [n−Rn], hi · (z − z′) = 0] (1)
=
∑
z∈Supp(Z)
Pr[z ∼ Z] Pr
H

 ⋃
z′∈Supp(Z)\{z}
[∀i ∈ [n−Rn], hi · (z − z′) = 0]


≤
∑
z∈Supp(Z)
Pr[z ∼ Z]
∑
z′∈Supp(Z)\{z}
Pr
H
[∀i ∈ [n−Rn], hi · (z − z′) = 0]
=
∑
z∈Supp(Z)
2−m · (2m − 1) ·
(
1
2
)n−Rn
(2)
≤ ǫ, (3)
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where HT = (hT1 , . . . , h
T
n−Rn) in (1), the first inequality follows from a union bound, and (2) follows
from the facts that for any non-zero a ∈ {0, 1}n and random h ∈ {0, 1}n, Prh[h · a = 0] = 1/2, and
that |Supp(Z)| = 2m for flat Z. Then, a (1−√ǫ)-fraction of codes in Cn,R can correct Z with error
probability
√
ǫ, since otherwise (3) does not hold. Therefore, the statement follows.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let Z be any flat distribution over {0, 1}n of entropy m. There is a linear code
of rate R that corrects Z with error probability ǫ for R = 1 −m/n − 2 log(ǫ−1)/n. The decoding
complexity is at most O(n22m).
Proof. The existence of such a code immediately follows from Proposition 2. Given a received
word v, the brute-force decoder checks if (v − z) · HT = 0 for all z ∈ Supp(Z), where H is the
parity check matrix. If so, output x satisfying x · G = v − z. Thus, the decoding is done in time
O(n2) · |Supp(Z)|.
Proposition 3 implies that for any flat Z of entropy O(log n), there is a code that corrects Z
with error probability ǫ in polynomial time. Although the construction is not fully explicit, we can
obtain such a code with probability 1− ǫ.
Conversely, we can show that the rate achieved in Proposition 3 is almost optimal.
Proposition 4. Let Z be any flat distribution over {0, 1}n of entropy m. If a code of rate R
corrects Z with error probability ǫ, then R ≤ 1−m/n− log(1− ǫ)/n.
Proof. Let (Enc,Dec) be a code that corrects Z with error probability ǫ. For x ∈ {0, 1}Rn, define
Dx = {v ∈ {0, 1}n : Dec(v) = x}. That is, Dx is the set of inputs that are decoded to x by
Dec. Since the code corrects the flat distribution Z with error probability ǫ, |Dx| ≥ (1 − ǫ)2m
for every x ∈ {0, 1}Rn. Since each Dx is disjoint,
∑
x∈{0,1}Rn |Dx| ≤ 2n. Therefore, we have that
(1− ǫ)2m · 2Rn ≤ 2n, which implies the statement.
By Proposition 3, one may hope to construct a single code that corrects errors from any flat
distribution with the same entropy, as constructed in [5] for the case of binary symmetric channels
by using Justesen’s construction [19]. However, it is impossible to construct such codes. We show
that for every deterministic coding scheme of rate k/n, there is a flat distribution Z of entropy
m that is not correctable by the scheme for any 1 ≤ m ≤ k. By combining this result with
Proposition 1, we can conclude that there is no coding scheme of rate k/n that corrects every flat
distribution of entropy m with 1 ≤ m ≤ k. For deterministic coding schemes, we assume that the
encoding function Enc is injective. Namely, for any distinct x, x′ ∈ Fk, Enc(x) 6= Enc(x′). The
assumption is necessary because otherwise the code always fails to decode either x or x′ such that
Enc(x) = Enc(x′).
Proposition 5. For any deterministic code of rate k/n and any m with 1 ≤ m ≤ k, there is a flat
distribution of entropy m that is not correctable by the code with error probability ǫ < 1/2.
Proof. By assumption, the code contains 2k codewords that are all distinct. Define a flat distri-
bution to be a uniform distribution over 2m distinct codewords c1, . . . , c2m . If the input to the
decoder is ci+cj for i, j ∈ [2m], the decoder cannot distinguish the two cases where the transmitted
codewords are ci and cj. Thus, the decoder outputs the wrong answer with probability at least 1/2
for at least one of the two cases.
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4 Pseudorandom Errors
We show that no efficient coding scheme can correct pseudorandom errors, which can be sampled
by pseudorandom generators.
Proposition 6. Assume that a one-way function exists. Then, for any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1), there
is a samplable distribution Z over {0, 1}n of entropy nǫ such that no polynomial-time algorithms
(Enc,Dec) can correct Z.
Proof. If a one-way function exists, there is a pseudorandom generator G : {0, 1}nǫ → {0, 1}n secure
for any polynomial-time algorithm [17]. Namely, the distribution G(Unǫ) is indistinguishable from
the uniform distribution Un for any polynomial-time algorithm. Then, a distribution Z = G(Unǫ)
is not correctable by polynomial-time algorithms (Enc,Dec). If so, we can construct a polynomial-
time distinguisher for pseudorandom generator by employing (Enc,Dec), and thus a contradiction
follows.
5 Errors with Membership Test
In this section, we present samplable distributions that are not pseudorandom, but cannot be
corrected by efficient coding schemes. For such distributions, we consider distributions for which the
membership test can be done efficiently. A distribution Z is called a distribution with membership
test if there is a polynomial-time algorithm D such that D(z) = 1 ⇔ z ∈ Supp(Z). Since the
algorithm D can distinguish Z from the uniform distribution, Z is not pseudorandom.
We consider a sampling algorithm/circuit that can access an oracle, which, on querying input x,
responds with the value f(x) for an a priori specified function f . It is assumed that the algorithm
can obtain the value of any input in a single step, and that other algorithms can also access the
same oracle. Such oracle algorithms/circuits are used in the field of computational complexity [2].
It is said to be relative to an oracle if algorithms are allowed to access it.
We show that there is an oracle relative to which there exists a samplable distribution with
membership test that is not correctable by efficient coding schemes with low rate. In the proof,
we use the technique called reconstruction paradigm [13, 34]. Before starting the proof, we briefly
describe the technique of [13, 34] and our proof idea.
In [13], the paradigm is used to prove that a random function is one-way with high probability.
Roughly speaking, it is shown that if f is not one-way, then f has a “short” description. Here,
we say f has a short description if, given access to some oracle A, the truth table of f can be
reconstructed by using A and some short information. It is shown in [13] that there are not so
many functions with short description, and thus a random function is one-way with high probability.
The technique was used in [34] to show the existence of incompressible samplable source with low
pseudoentropy.
Here, we use the technique to prove the existence of uncorrectable samplable distributions with
membership test. By following the approach of [34], we define a class of functions correctf , which
contains functions f that can be efficiently corrected by some coding scheme. Then, we show that
correctf has a short description. Since there are not so many functions with short description, we
can show that there is a function f that cannot be corrected with efficient coding schemes.
We now begin the formal proof. Let N = 2n,K = 2k,M = 2m. Let F be the set of injective
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functions f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n. For each f ∈ F , define an oracle Of such that
Of (b, y) =


OSf (y) if b = 0, y ∈ {0, 1}m
OMf (y) if b = 1, y ∈ {0, 1}n
⊥ otherwise
,
OMf (y) =
{
1 if y ∈ f({0, 1}m)
0 if y /∈ f({0, 1}m) ,
OSf (y) = f(y).
Namely, on input y, the oracle OMf outputs the membership of y under f , and OSf samples f(y).
Thus, sampling f(y) can be performed by querying (0, y) to Of , and membership test of y can be
done by (1, y).
Let correctf be the set of functions f ∈ F for which there exist oracle circuits (Enc,Dec) that
make q queries to oracle Of in total and correct f(Um) with rate k/n. For each f ∈ correctf , fix a
pair (Enc,Dec) that make q queries to Of and correct f(Um) with rate k/n. We define
invertf = {y ∈ {0, 1}m : for any x ∈ {0, 1}k , on inputEnc(x) + f(y), Dec queries OSf on y},
forgef = {y ∈ {0, 1}m : for some x ∈ {0, 1}k , on inputEnc(x) + f(y), Dec does not query OSf on y}.
Note that invertf and forgef is a partition of {0, 1}m. We also define
invertible = {f ∈ correctf : |invertf | > ǫ · 2m},
forgeable = {f ∈ correctf : |forgef | ≥ δ · 2m},
where ǫ and δ are any positive constants satisfying ǫ + δ = 1. Note that correctf = invertible ∪
forgeable. Roughly speaking, if f ∈ invertible, an ǫ-fraction of f(y) can be corrected by querying
OSf on y, which implies that f(y) is invertible by Dec. For f ∈ forgeable, a δ-fraction of f(y) can
be corrected without querying OSf on y, which implies that f(y) is generated by Dec with no help
from the oracle.
In the following, we show that every f ∈ correctf = invertible ∪ forgeable has a short descrip-
tion. For each f ∈ correctf , we present a way for constructing the truth table of f by employing
(Enc,Dec). If f ∈ invertible, it is done by computing Enc(x) + f(y) and monitoring oracle queries
that Dec(Enc(x) + f(y)) makes to OSf . For y on which Dec does not query OSf , the pair (y, f(y)) is
stored in a look-up table. Similarly, if f ∈ forgeable, then Dec corrects f(y) without querying OSf
on y. This means that f(y) can be described using Dec and Enc(x)+f(y), and thus if Enc(x)+f(y)
has a short description, the size of forgeable is small.
First, we show that f ∈ invertible has a short description.
Lemma 1. Take any f ∈ invertible and a pair of oracle circuits (Enc,Dec) that makes at most q
queries to Of in total and corrects f(Um) with rate k/n. Then f can be described using at most
log
(
N
c
)
+ log
(
M
c
)
+ log
((
N − c
M − c
)
(M − c)!
)
bits, given (Enc,Dec), where c = ǫM/q.
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Proof. First, consider an oracle circuit A such that, on input z, A picks any x ∈ {0, 1}k and
simulates Dec on input Enc(x) + z. Then, for any y ∈ invertf , on input f(y), A outputs y by
making at most q queries to Of .
Next, we show that for any f ∈ invertible, f has a short description given A. Without loss of
generality, we assume that A makes distinct queries to OSf . We also assume that on input f(y), A
always queries OSf on y before it outputs y. We will show that there is a subset T ⊆ f(invertf ) such
that f can be described given T , B(T ), f |{0,1}m\B(T ), where f |X denotes the set {(x, f(x)) : x ∈ X}
and B(T ) = {y ∈ {0, 1}m : y ← A(z), z ∈ T}.
We describe how to construct T below.
Construct-T :
1. Initially, T is empty, and all elements in T ∗ = f(invertf ) are candidates for inclusion in T .
2. Choose the lexicographically smallest z from T ∗, put z in T , and remove z from T ∗.
3. Simulate A on input z, and halt the simulation immediately after A queries OSf on y. Let
y′1, . . . , y
′
p be the queries that A makes to OSf , where y′p = y and p ≤ q.
• Remove f(y′1), . . . , f(y′p−1) from T ∗. (This means that these elements will never belong
to T , and in simulating A(z) in the recovering phase, the answers to these queries are
made by using the look-up table for f .)
• Continue to remove the lexicographically smallest z from T ∗ until we have removed
exactly q − 1 elements in Step 3.
4. Return to Step 2.
Next, we describe how to reconstruct f from T , B(T ), and f |{0,1}m\B(T ). We show how to
recover the look-up table for f on values in B(T ).
Recover-f :
1. Choose the lexicographically smallest element z ∈ T , and remove it from T .
2. Simulate A on input z, and halt the simulation immediately after A queries OSf on y for
which the answer does not exist in the look-up table for f . Since the query y satisfies that
y = f−1(z), add the entry (y, z) to the look-up table.
3. Return to Step 1.
We explain why we can correctly simulate A(z) in Step 2 of Recover-f . Since B(T ) and
f |{0,1}m\B(T ) are given, we can answer all queries to OMf . For any query y′ to OSf , it must be either
(1) y′ /∈ B(T ), or (2) y′ is the output of A on input z′ such that z′ ∈W and z′ is lexicographically
smaller than z. In either case, the look-up table has the corresponding entry, and thus we can
answer the query.
In each iteration in Construct-T , we add one element to T and remove exactly q element
from T ∗. Since initially the size of T ∗ = f(invertf ) is ǫM , the size of T in the end is c = ǫM/q.
Finally, we evaluate the number of bits to describe T , B(T ), and f |{0,1}m\B(T ). Since T can
be specified by choosing c elements from the set f(invertf ) ⊆ {0, 1}n of size at most N , T can
be described using at most log
(N
c
)
bits. Similarly, B(T ) can be specified by choosing at most |T |
elements from the set {0, 1}m of size M . Hence, B(T ) can be described using log (Mc ) bits. The
look-up table for f |{0,1}m\B(T ) consists of {(y, f(y)) : y ∈ {0, 1}m \B(T )}, which can be specified by
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first choosing the elements of {f(y) : y ∈ {0, 1}m \B(T )} from {0, 1}n \ f(B(T )) and then ordering
them lexicographically with respect to the input y ∈ {0, 1}m \B(T ). Since f is injective, we have
that |B(T )| = |T | = c, and thus |{f(y) : y ∈ {0, 1}m \B(T )}| =M − c, |{0, 1}n \ f(B(T ))| = N − c,
and |{0, 1}m \ B(T )| = M − c. Thus, the look-up table for f |{0,1}m\B(T ) can be described using
log(
(N−c
M−c
)
(M − c)!) bits. Therefore, the statement follows.
We show that the fraction of f ∈ F for which f ∈ invertible and f(Um) is correctable is small.
Lemma 2. If m > 3 log s + log n + O(1), then the fraction of functions f ∈ F such that f ∈
invertible and f(Um) can be corrected by a pair of oracle circuits (Enc,Dec) of total size s is less
than 2−(sn log s+1) for all sufficiently large n.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that, given (Enc,Dec), the fraction is
|invertible|(N
M
)
M !
≤
(
N
c
)(
M
c
)(
N−c
M−c
)
(M − c)!(N
M
)
M !
=
(M
c
)
c!
,
where c = ǫM/(qK). By using the fact that q ≤ s and the inequalities (nk) < ( enk )k and n! > (ne )n,
the expression is upper bounded by
(
eM
c
)c (e
c
)c
=
(
e2q2
ǫ2M
)ǫM/q
<
(
1
2
)ns log s+1
for all sufficiently large n. The last inequality follows from the fact that
e2q2
ǫ2M
<
e2q2
ǫ2 Ω(s3n)
<
1
2
and
ǫM
q
>
ǫΩ(s3n)
q
> ns log s+ 1.
Next, we show that forgeable has a short description.
Lemma 3. Take any f ∈ forgeable and a pair of oracle circuits (Enc,Dec) that make at most q
queries to Of in total and corrects f(Um) with rate k/n. Then f can be described using at most
log
(
M
d
)
+ log
((
N − d
M − d
)
(M − d)!
)
+ d(k +m+ log q)
bits, given (Enc,Dec), where d = δM/q.
Proof. First, consider an oracle circuit A such that, on input w, A obtains x by simulating Dec on
input w, queries OMf on w−Enc(x), and outputs ⊥ if OMf (w−Enc(x)) = 0, and x otherwise. Then,
A satisfies that, on input w, A outputs ⊥ if w /∈ Enc({0, 1}k) + f({0, 1}m), and Dec(w) otherwise.
Next, we show that for any f ∈ forgeable, f has a short description given A. Without loss
of generality, we assume that A makes distinct queries to OSf and OMf . We also assume that for
x ∈ {0, 1}k and y ∈ {0, 1}m, A(Enc(x)+f(y)) always queries OMf on f(y) before it outputs x. Note
that for y ∈ forgef , there is some x ∈ {0, 1}k such that, on input Enc(x) + f(y), A does not query
OSf on y.
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We will show that there is a subset Y ⊆ forgef such that f can be described given Y , f |{0,1}m\Y ,
and {(xy, ay, by) ∈ {0, 1}k × [M ]× [q] : y ∈ Y } of a set of advice strings. For x ∈ {0, 1}k , we define
D(x) = {Enc(x) + f(y) : y ∈ {0, 1}m}. Note that |D(x)| =M for any x ∈ {0, 1}k .
We describe how to construct Y below.
Construct-Y :
1. Initially, Y is empty. All elements in Y ∗ = forgef are candidates for inclusion in Y . For every
x ∈ {0, 1}k , set Dx = {Enc(x) + f(y) : y ∈ forgef}. We write Dk =
⋃
x∈{0,1}k Dx.
2. Choose the lexicographically smallest y from Y ∗, put y in Y , and remove y from Y ∗.
3. Choose the lexicographically smallest w from the set of Enc(x)+ f(y) ∈ Dx such that A does
not query OSf on y. If w = Enc(x) + f(y), set xy = x. Then, for every x′ ∈ {0, 1}k , remove
Enc(x′) + f(y) from Dx′ . (This removal means that hereafter there are no elements in Dk for
which A outputs some x such that f(y) is the error vector.) When w is the lexicographically
t-th smallest element in D(x), set ay = t (so that we can recognize that the ay-th element in
D(x) is w in the recovering phase).
4. Simulate A on input w, and halt the simulation immediately after A queries OMf on f(y).
Let y′1, . . . , y
′
p be the queries that A makes to OSf , and z′1, . . . , z′r = f(y) be the queries that
A makes to OMf . Set by = r (so that we can recognize that the by-th query that Dec makes
to OMf is f(y) in the recovering phase).
(a) For every x′ ∈ {0, 1}k , remove Enc(x′) + f(y′1), . . . ,Enc(x′) + f(y′p) from Dx′ .
(b) For every i ∈ [p], if z′i ∈ f(forgef ), then for every x′ ∈ {0, 1}k , remove Enc(x′) + z′i from
Dx′ , and otherwise, do nothing.
(c) Continue to remove the elements Enc(x′) + f(y) from Dx′ for every x
′ ∈ {0, 1}k for
the lexicographically smallest w = Enc(x) + f(y) ∈ Dk until we have removed exactly
(q − 1)K elements from Dk in Step 4.
5. Return to Step 2.
Next, we describe how to construct f from Y , f |{0,1}m\Y , and {(xy, ay, by) ∈ {0, 1}k× [M ]× [q] :
y ∈ Y }. We show how to recover the look-up table for f on values in Y .
Recover-f :
1. Choose the lexicographically smallest y ∈ Y , and remove it from Y . Then, choose the
lexicographically ay-th smallest element w from D(xy).
2. Simulate A on input w, and halt the simulation immediately after A makes the by-th query
to OMf . Since the by-th query is f(y), add the entry (y, f(y)) to the look-up table.
3. Return to Step 1.
We explain why we can correctly simulate A(w) in Step 2 of Recover-f . For any query y′
to OSf , it must be either (1) y′ /∈ Y or (2) y′ is lexicographically smaller than y. In case (1), we
can answer the query by using f |{0,1}m\Y . In case (2), since y was chosen as the lexicographically
smallest element such that A does not query OSf on y, the look-up table has the answer to the
query. Consider any of the first by − 1 queries z′ to OMf . If z′ ∈ f({0, 1}m), namely z′ = f(y′) for
some y′, then it must be either (1) y′ /∈ Y or (2) y′ is lexicographically smaller than y. In either
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case, the look-up table has the entry (y′, z′). If z′ /∈ f({0, 1}m), there is no entry for z′ in the
look-up table. Thus, we can answer the query by saying “yes” if z′ is in the look-up table, and
“no” otherwise.
In each iteration in Construct-Y , we add one element to Y and remove exactly qK elements
from Dk. Since initially the size of Dk is at least δKM , the size of Y in the end is at least d = δM/q.
Finally, we evaluate the number of bits to describe Y , f |{0,1}m\Y , and {(xy, ay, by) ∈ {0, 1}k ×
[M ] × [q] : y ∈ Y }. Since Y can be specified by choosing d elements from the set forgef ⊆ {0, 1}m
of size at most M , Y can be described using log
(M
d
)
bits. By the same argument in the proof of
Lemma 1 for f |{0,1}m\B(T ), we can show that the look-up table for f |{0,1}m\Y can be described using
log(
(N−d
M−d
)
(M − d)!) bits. By simply listing the elements, the set {(xy , ay, by) ∈ {0, 1}k × [M ]× [q] :
y ∈ Y } can be described using d(k +m+ log q) bits. Therefore, the statement follows.
We show that the fraction of f ∈ F for which f ∈ forgeable and f(Um) is correctable is small.
Lemma 4. If m > 3 log s + log n + O(1) and m < n − k − 2 log s − O(1), then the fraction of
functions f ∈ F such that f ∈ forgeable and f(Um) can be corrected by a pair of oracle circuits
(Enc,Dec) of total size s is less than 2−(sn log s+1) for all sufficiently large n.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that, given (Enc,Dec), the fraction is
|forgeable|(N
M
)
M !
≤
(M
d
)(N−d
M−d
)
(M − d)!(N
M
)
M !
2d(k+m+log q) =
(M
d
)
(N
d
)
d!
(qKM)d,
where d = δM/q. By using the fact that q ≤ s and the inequalities (nk) < ( enk )k, (nk) > (nk )k, and
n! >
(
n
e
)n
, the expression is upper bounded by
(
eM
d
)d( d
N
)d ( e
d
)d
(qKM)d =
(
e2q2KM
δN
)δM/q
<
(
1
2
)ns log s+1
for all sufficiently large n. The last inequality follows from the fact that
e2q2KM
δN
<
e2q2
δΩ(s2n)
<
1
2
and
δM
q
>
δΩ(s3n)
q
> ns log s+ 1.
We obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. For any m and k satisfying 3 log s+ log n+O(1) < m < n− k− 2 log s−O(1), there
exist injective functions f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n such that, given oracle access to Of , (1) f(Um) is a
samplable distribution with membership test of entropy m, and (2) f(Um) cannot be corrected with
rate k/n by oracle circuits of size s.
Proof. Since correctf = invertible ∪ forgeable, it follows from Lemmas 2 and 4 that for a fixed
(Enc,Dec) of size s, the fraction of functions f ∈ F such that (Enc,Dec) corrects f(Um) with rate
k/n is less than 2−(sn log s). Since there are at most 2sn log s circuits of size s, there are functions
f ∈ F such that f(Um) cannot be corrected with rate k/n by oracle circuits of size s. Given oracle
access to Of , f(Um) is samplable. Since f is injective, f(Um) has entropy m.
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The following corollary immediately follows.
Corollary 1. For any m and k satisfying ω(log n) < m < n− k − ω(log n), there exists an oracle
relative to which there exists a samplable distribution with membership test of entropy m that cannot
be corrected with rate k/n by polynomial size circuits.
6 Positive Results
In this section, we present positive results for correcting samplable additive errors.
6.1 Errors from Linear Subspaces
We show that if the set of error vectors forms a linear subspace, every error can be corrected by
a linear code with optimal rate. Let Z ′ = {z1, z2, . . . , zm} ⊆ Fn be a set of linearly independent
vectors. We construct a linear code that corrects additive errors from the linear span of Z ′.
Proposition 7. Let Z be the uniform distribution over the linear span of Z ′, which has entropy
m. There is a linear code of rate 1−m/n that corrects Z by syndrome decoding.
Proof. Consider n−m vectors wm+1, . . . , wn ∈ Fn such that the set {z1, z2, . . . , zm, wm+1, . . . , wn}
forms a basis of Fn. Then, there is a linear transformation T : Fn → Fm such that T (zi) = ei
and T (wi) = 0, where ei is the vector with 1 in the i-th position and 0 elsewhere. Let H be the
matrix in Fm×n such that xHT = T (x), and consider a code with parity check matrix H. Let
z =
∑m
i=1 aizi be a vector in the linear span of Z
′, where ai ∈ F. Since z ·HT = (
∑m
i=1 aizi) ·HT =∑m
i=1 aiei = (a1, . . . , am), the code can correct the error z by syndrome decoding. Since H ∈ Fm×n
is the parity check matrix, the rate of the code is (n−m)/n.
6.2 A Computational Condition
Let Z = f(Ur) be a flat distribution over {0, 1}n of entropy m associated with a samplable additive
channel, where f is an efficiently computable function, and r ≥ m. We give a computational
condition under which Z is efficiently correctable. Roughly speaking, we show that if a variant of
the function f is efficiently “invertible”, then Z can be efficiently corrected.
Specifically, for function f : {0, 1}r → {0, 1}n, we define function g : {0, 1}r × H → H ×
{0, 1}m+2c logn such that
g(y, h) = (h, h(f(y))),
where H = {h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+2c logn} is a family of linear universal hash functions [4, 31], and
c is a positive constant. The universality means that for any distinct x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n,
Pr
h∈H
[h(x) = h(x′)] ≤ 2−(m+2c logn),
and the linearity means that for any x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n and a, b ∈ {0, 1}, h(ax+ bx′) = ah(x) + bh(x′).
As efficient “invertibility”, we introduce the notion of distributionally one-way function [18].
Intuitively, such a function g guarantees that the distribution (x, g(x)) for random x is difficult to
be simulated by efficient algorithms given only g(x).
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Definition 5. A function g is said to be distributionally one-way if it is computable in polynomial
time and there exists a constant c > 0 such that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
A, the statistical distance between (x, g(x)) and (A(g(x)), g(x)) is at least 1/nc, where x ∼ Un.
We show that if the function g defined above is not distributionally one-way, then the error
distribution Z = f(Ur) is efficiently correctable. Before giving the formal proof, we describe the
underlying idea.
We employ the technique used in the proof of [34, Theorem 6.3] that shows the necessity of
one-way functions for separating pseudoentropy and compressibility. In the proof, it is observed
that every samplable distribution Z can be optimally compressed by a hash function h such that
a sample z from Z is simply compressed to h(z). In addition, if distributionally one-way functions
do not exist, it is shown that z can be recovered from h(z) by a polynomial-time algorithm. We
observe that a family of linear hash functions is used for giving a recovering algorithm. Since a
linear compression function is a dual object of a linear code that corrects additive errors [3], we
can construct a linear code correcting additive errors of Z. More specifically, we construct an
efficient syndrome decoder that recovers z = f(y) from a syndrome h(z) by assuming that f is not
distributionally one-way. A problem for recovering z from h(z) is that there may be exponentially
many preimages of h(z), and we need to choose z that is in the support of Z. To solve the problem,
we define the function g(y, h) = (h, h(f(y))), and construct a code by assuming that g is not
distributionally one-way.
Theorem 2. If g(y, h) = (h, h(f(y))) is not distributionally one-way, then the flat distribution
Z = f(Ur) over {0, 1}n of entropy m can be corrected by a polynomial-time coding scheme of rate
1−m/n− (2c log n)/n and error probability O(n−c).
Proof. For each h ∈ H, define Ch = {z ∈ Supp(Z) : ∃z′ ∈ Supp(Z) s.t. z′ 6= z ∧ h(z) = h(z′)}.
Namely, Ch is the set of inputs with collisions under h. By a union bound, it holds that for any
z ∈ Supp(Z),
Pr
h∈H
[∃z′ ∈ Supp(Z) : z′ 6= z ∧ h(z′) = h(z)] ≤ |Supp(Z)|
2m+2c logn
≤ 1
n2c
.
Thus, Eh∈H [|Ch|] ≤ 2m/n2c. We say h ∈ H is good if |Ch| ≤ 2m/nc. By Markov’s inequality, we
have that
Pr
h∈H
[
|Ch| > 2
m
nc
]
<
1
nc
.
By the assumption that g is not distributionally one-way, there is a polynomial-time algorithm
A such that the statistical distance between ((y, h), g(y, h)) and (A(g(y, h)), g(y, h)) is at most n−c,
where y ∼ Ur and h ∈ H. Then, it holds that
Pr
A,y,h
[g(A(g(y, h))) = g(y, h)] ≥ 1− 1
nc
,
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A, y ∼ Ur, and h ∈ H. Thus, we have that
Pr
A,y,h
[g(A(g(y, h))) = g(y, h) ∧ h is good] ≥ 1− 2
nc
.
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By fixing the coins of A and h ∈ H, it holds that there are deterministic algorithm A′ and h0 ∈ H
such that h0 is good and
Pr
y∼Ur
[g(A′(g(y, h0))) = g(y, h0)] ≥ 1− 2
nc
.
For y ∈ {0, 1}r satisfying g(A′(g(y, h0))) = g(y, h0), we writeA′(g(y, h0)) = (A′1(g(y, h0)), A′2(g(y, h0))) =
(y′, h′). Then, it holds that h′ = h0 and h0(f(y)) = h0(f(y
′)). Furthermore, since h0 is good,
Pry[f(y) /∈ Ch0 ] ≥ 1 − 1/nc. Since H is a set of linear hash functions, there is a matrix H0 ∈
{0, 1}(m+2c logn)×n such that xHT0 = h0(x) for x ∈ {0, 1}n. Consider a linear coding scheme in
which H0 is employed as the parity check matrix, and A
′
1 is employed for recovering errors from
syndromes. That is, Enc(x) = xG for a full-rank matrix G ∈ {0, 1}(n−m−2c logn)×n satisfying
GHT0 = 0, and Dec(y) = (y − f(A′1(h0, yHT0 )))G−1, where G−1 ∈ {0, 1}n×(n−m−2c logn) is a right
inverse matrix of G. Then, for any x ∈ {0, 1}m,
Pr
y∼Ur
[Dec(Enc(x) + f(y)) = x]
= Pr
y∼Ur
[
Enc(x) + f(y)− f(A′1(h0, (Enc(x) + f(y))HT0 )) = xG
]
= Pr
y∼Ur
[f(A′1(g(y, h0))) = f(y)],
where we use the property that GG−1 = I, Enc(x) = xG, GHT0 = 0, and xH
T
0 = h0(x). Since the
probability that g(A0(g(y, h0))) = g(y, h0) is at least 1 − 2/nc, and for any y ∈ {0, 1}r satisfying
g(A0(g(y, h0))) = g(y, h0), Pry[f(y) /∈ Ch0 ] ≥ 1− 1/nc, we have that
Pr
y∼Ur
[f(A′1(g(y, h0))) = f(y)] ≥ 1−
3
nc
.
Thus, Z can be corrected with error probability O(n−c). Since f is efficiently computable, both
Enc and Dec can be computed in time polynomial in n. Hence the statement follows.
It is known that if one-way functions do not exist, then neither do distributionally one-way
functions [18]. Thus, Theorem 2 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If one-way functions do not exist, every samplable flat distribution over {0, 1}n of
entropy m can be corrected by an efficient coding scheme of rate 1−m/n − (2c log n)/n and error
probability O(nc) for any constant c > 0.
The above corollary indicates the necessity of one-way functions for proving the impossibility
results of Sections 4 and 5.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we study the correctability of samplable additive errors with unbounded error rate.
We have considered a relatively simple setting in which the error distribution is identical for every
coding scheme and codeword. The results imply that even when a distribution is not pseudorandom
by membership test, it is difficult to correct every such samplable distribution by efficient coding
schemes. Nevertheless, a positive result can be obtained if we consider much more structured errors
such as errors from linear subspaces. We present some possible future work of this study.
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Further study on the correctability. In this work, we have mostly discussed impossibility
results. Thus, showing non-trivial possibility results is interesting. A possible direction is to
consider more structured errors than samplable errors. One can consider computationally structured
errors such as errors computed by log-space machines, constant-depth circuits, or monotone circuits.
Also, one can consider other types of structures, e.g., errors are introduced in a split-state manner.
Namely, an error vector is split into several parts, and each part is independently computed. This
model has been well-studied in the context of leakage-resilient cryptography [11, 22] and non-
malleable codes [12, 6, 1]. BSC can be seen as an extreme of this type of channels in which each
error bit is computed by the same biased-sampler.
Characterizing correctability. We have investigated the correctability of samplable additive
errors using entropy as a criterion. There may be another better criterion for characterizing the
correctability of these errors, which might be related to efficient computability, to which sampla-
bility is directly related. Since we have considered general distributions as error distributions, the
information-spectrum approach [32, 16] may be more plausible.
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